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3ABSTRACT
This research assignment has investigated the overall nature of the
investment climate in the People's Republic of China (PRC).The investment
climate was analysed using a Political Risk Analysis (PRA) framework,
whereby the PRC was scrutinised closely for its most defining socio-
economic features and, especially, for its most salient political risk factors.
Based on this, the assignment evaluated this climate with specific relevance
to the investment plans of the South African company SAB-Miller.
Since its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)in 2001, the PRC
has intensified its economic restructuring process, a necessary and
inevitable process, in order to comply with the terms of the WTOframework.
This period of adjustment has heightened the anxiety over the strength of
the Chinese economy, and the repercussions and/or opportunities for the
multinational SAB-Miller.To remedy this uncertainty, this assignment has
drawn up an in-depth qualitative scenario, in order to forecast the major
trends of the PRC's short-term socio-political future. The main findings of
the assignment indicate that a 'high-road' scenario is the most likely to
occur in the PRC in the short-term. Clearly, this favourable forecast 1S
dependent on the continuation of the current economic and socio-political
restructuring process in the PRC.
With regards to the main macro-political risks factors, the assignment draws
attention to several critical areas of concern. Firstly, the lack of
legitimatisation from the 'bottom-up' is a worrying feature, especially in light
of the growing economic disparities between citizens and between provinces.
Secondly, the financial and governmental sectors need a thorough
restructuring, according to WTO criteria. Thirdly, the fragmentation of the
market inside the PRe undermines the potential of the PRC government to
diffuse the benefits of economic growth and to absorb the downsides of
globalisation. Micro-specific risk factors for the company SAB-Miller are
focussed predominantly on the speed and the depth of the implementation of
the guidelines of the WTO. Especially with regards to the lowering of intra-
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4provincial trade barriers and the efficacy of the distribution networks. Lastly,
SAB-Miller should eliminate any risk factors, which may originate from
inside the company's behaviour, such as the effects of its adopted labour
policies. Lastly, it should maintain a clear level of transparency in their
associations with governmental institutions. Throughout the assignment,
these risk factors will be investigated and related to the overall political risk
climate and utilised to draw conclusions concerning the potential of the
investment plans of SAB-Miller.
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5OPSOMMING
Hierdie werkstuk het die beleggingsklimaat van die Volksrepubliek China
(VRC)ondersoek. Die beleggingssklimaat is ontleed deur gebruik te maak
van 'n model vir Politieke Risiko Analise (PRA),waarby die VRC sorgvuldig
onderwerp is aan 'n ondersoek van sy mees kenmerkende sosio-ekonomiese
faktore en van die belangrikste risiko faktore. Hierop gebaseer, het die
werkstuk ook die beleggingsklimaat ontleed met spesifieke betrekking tot die
beleggingsplanne van die Suid Afrikaanse maatskappy SAB-Miller.
Sedert toetreding tot die Wêreld Handelsorganisasie (WHO)in 2001, het die
VRC sy transformasie proses versnel ten einde te voldoen aan die WHO se
toelatingskriteria. Hierdie tydperk van aanpassing het kommer gewek oor die
Chinese ekonomie asook oor die gevolge daarvan vir die maatskappy SAB-
Miller. Om hierdie onsekerheid aan te spreek het die werkstuk 'n
kwalitatiewe scenario voorgestel, ten einde die hoofpunte van die VRC se
sosio-ekonomiese kort-termyn toekoms vooruit te skat. Die gevolgtrekking
van hierdie werkstuk toon aan dat 'n 'high-road' scenario die waarskynlikste
is gedurende die kort termyn. Dis ook duidelik dat die gunstige
vooruitskattings afhanklik is van die voortsetting van die huidige sosio-
ekonomiese transformasie proses van die VRC.
Met betrekking tot die vernaamste makro-politieke risiko faktore het die
werkstuk aandag gegee aan verskeie kommerwekkende aspekte. Eerstens,
die gebrek aan elektorale regmatigheid van die 'grond-af, waarskynlik in die
lig van die toenemende ekonomisiese verskille tussen burgers asook tussen
provinsies. Tweedens, moet die finansiële- en staatssektore grondig
herstruktureer word volgens die WHO riglyne. Derdens, ondermyn die
fragmentasie van die mark van binne China die mag van die VRCse regering
om die voordele van die ekonomiese groei gelykmatig te versprei, asook om
die nadele van Globalisasie te absorbeer. Mikro-spesifieke risiko faktore vir
die SAB-Miller maatskappy het hoofsaaklik gefokus op die spoed en die
diepgang van die implementering van die WHO riglyne. In besonder met
betrekking tot die hoë interprovinsiale handelsbelemmerings en die optimale
effektiwiteit van die verspreidingskakels. Laatstens, moet SAB-Miller enige
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6risiko faktore elimineer wat as gevolgvan die maatskappy se eie gedrag kan
onstaan, byvoorbeeld die maatskappy se arbeidsvoorwaardes. SAB-Miller
moet ook 'n duidelike aanspreeklikheidsfunksie daarstel, in hulle
betrekkinge met Chinese staatsinstellings. Deur die hele werkstuk word
hierdie risiko faktore ondersoek en in verband gebring met die algemene
politieke risiko klimaat, en word ook gebruik om gevolgtrekkinge te maak
aangaande die potensiaal van SAB-Millerse beleggingsplanne.
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91. POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY
1.1. Introduction
In 1978, the People's Republic of China (PRC)then under the leadership of
State President Deng Xiao Ping, embarked on a mission to modernise the
Chinese economy, to redefine its socio-political structures and to break with
its self-imposed international isolation. As a result, the world's most
populous country entered the global trading regime and quickly established
itself as an adept participant in the global economy. From that time
onwards, the PRC has radically, though incrementally, embarked on a
course sending the PRC into a market-driven economy, albeit with 'Chinese
Characteristics."l This new aim of direction has propelled the PRC towards
astonishing growth rates for consecutive years. For instance, in 1999, the
PRC experienced a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate of 7.1% to 7.3%; in
2000 it saw a rate of 8.2% to 8.4%; and in 2001, it saw its rate levelled off
slightly at 7.3%2.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) rewarded the PRC for these
achievements in December 2001, welcoming it into the trading alliance as a
new member. As never before in its history, China (the self-appointed Middle
Kingdom) has opened its arms to the rest of the world. However, the PRC is
facing the daunting task of restructuring itself, politically, socially and
economically. It is the highly interdependent nature of these three problem
areas that increase the risk factors for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in
China. By evaluating the achievements and/ or failures of the PRC
government in each of these categories, once can arrive at a tentative
medium (1-3 years) to long-term (5-8 years) forecast for the FDI climate in
China.
1 Langlois, J.D.Jr. (2001): The WTOand China's Financial System, p.6l0
2 The Economist (2002): Economic Data, p.l & De Standaard (2000): China: Een Rijzende
Ster? p.2.
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This evaluation is structured around five chapters that will each in turn
investigate specific aspects of the PRA of the PRC for SAB-Miller. The first
chapter of this assignment intends to clarify the employed methodological
techniques as well as to remedy certain problems inherent to PRA
methodology. In the second chapter, the assignment will give a brief overview
of the PRC's economic profile, followed by the explanation as to why this
economic profile has attracted the attention of worldwide Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)and the logic behind that flowof FDI.
The third chapter starts off by tracing the developments of the Chinese
political economy from 1978 until post-1993. After the major opening and
the subsequent boom of the Chinese economy, it has become clear that
certain major restructuring processes are necessary, if the PRC is to
continue on its present élan. Therefore, this chapter will proceed to outline
the recent political developments that are linked to these restructuring
processes, including the investigating into the continuity of governmental
policies, the issue of corruption and the very important matter of
incapacitation of the Chinese state.
The fourth chapter of this investigation will deal specifically with the PRC's
structural economic liabilities, namely the restructuring of its financial
sector, the reform of its State-Owned Enterprises (SOE's) and the growing
social inequalities. This chapter will also deal with the fragmentation of the
market inside the PRC and the implications this fragmentation will have on
the PRe, after its recent accession to the WTO.The final chapter will attempt
to investigate the sector-specific opportunities, techniques, policies and
problems for SAB-Millerin the Chinese market.
Though the initial focus of Political Risk Analysis (PRA)is mostly on the
negative effects and outcomes of political risk, it is also as Krayenbuehl
(1988:32) narrates: "not only the task of foreseeing a deteriorating situation;
it is equally important to find new opportunities where the degree of political
risk is diminishing." This major relevance of this study is that it proceeds to
show that, despite the diverging and sometimes quite contradictory scenario
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outlooks for the further socio-economic evolution of the PRC, it remains a
highly attractive investment market for consumer goods of high quality and
international allure. Though the study identifies the gaps and uncertainties
of investing in China, it also clearly indicates that the potential for astute
investors is very lucrative. This report will therefore investigate the risk
factors of and the opportunities inherent in the niche-market of lager and
beer products in the PRC. Since the South African multinational SAB-Miller
has already acquired a strong foothold in the Chinese market, this report
will therefore place more emphasis on risk management issues, as they
pertain to SAB-Miller'ssector-specific investments.
1.2. Defining the Parameters
At the outset of any risk analysis and of a risk management investigation, it
is necessary to bring forward a useful working definition. In the literary
review of this subject matter, one is immediately confronted by a plethora of
different definitions- of the matter. This report will define Political Risk
Analysis (PRA) as "the analysis of the possibility that factors caused or
influenced by government political decisions or other unforeseen events in a
country will affect business climates in such a way that investors lose money
or not make as much money as they expected, when the initial decision to
investment was made," (Brink, 2002: 10).
The report will consist of three major risk assessments, namely a socio-
political risk assessment, an economic risk assessment and a financial risk
assessment. Following the example of Erb, Campbell and Viskanta (1996:30)
the political assessment will rely predominantly on expert's advice and
qualitative descriptions of the present -and future- political climate in the
PRC. Secondly, the economic risk assessment will be founded upon an
objective analysis of hard and quantitative data, as is available on the
PRC's economy. Lastly, this report will use a mixture of hard, quantitative
3 For overview of conceptual definitions see J.D. Simon. 1982. "Political Risk Assessment:
Past Trends and Future Prospects." P.63-64.
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data and soft, qualitative information, to deal with the risks generated by
financial risks.
As Brink (2002:5) states: "risk models should be adaptable and flexible, in
that they can be reconstructed to suit industry and investor specific, micro-
circumstances. The use of a certain method of analysis greatly influences the
investment decision, as well as the reliability and validity of the eventual
product." This report, therefore, will develop a scenario of the PRC at present
and its intended course in the future. The reason why such a flexible,
qualitative model of PRAis chosen, lies in the fact that scenarios allow for a
better strategic thinking by the investor vis cl vis the PRC. Secondly, it clearly
improves the timing and flexibility of decisions and responses to changing
socio-political circumstances, which are particularly prone to rapidly change
overnight. Lastly and most importantly, they can be modified or re-oriented
quickly to the suit the future gains or opportunities for the astute investor in
an ever-changing environment.
1.3. Methodological Problems of Data Interpretation
It has become a mainstream assumption that the data provided by the
Chinese statistical bureaus and the media are "plagued by problems of
conceptualisation, missing data, incorrect reporting, sampling errors,
inconsistency of mirror statistics and other pitfalls," according to China
expert Lardy (2003:249). As such, much if not all of the official economic and
financial indicators should be treated with severe caution and apprehension.
This assumption therefore makes it extremely difficult to choose and employ
the right methodology to assess any risk factors of the PRC economy.
However Lardy (2003:254) exposes this assumption to be factually incorrect
and his main conclusion is that "it would appear difficult, if not impossible,
to explain China's [economic] performance without real economic growth
that is reasonably close to the official data." Therefore, an analysis of China's
economic performance should not shy away from utilising the official data,
especially if such data can be compared, analysed and complemented by the
intelligent use of 'objective' secondary sources. This report therefore, makes
use of various official statistics and analyses, combined with secondary
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sources of authoritative status, in order to get a complete and accurate
picture of the PRC's investment climate.
2. THE ECONOMICPROFILE OF THE PRC
2.1. A Bird's Eye View of the PRe Economy
Despite sporting a massive population of over 1.261.832.482 people (a 2000
est.) the PRC has achieved tremendous national economic performance, by
consistently maintaining a high GDP growth rate for nearly two decades. In
the last few years, during 2000 to 2002, the PRC achieved an impressive 7%
to 8% growth rate. Preliminary governmental data shows a GDP growth rate
of about 9.9% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2003, the fastest pace
since 1997 (The Economist, 2003: 1). One can draw three main conclusions
from this data. First of all, it re-affirms China's position as the fastest-
growing economy in Asia and its stellar growth to an international
powerhouse. Secondly, this shows that China now has one of the largest
economies in the world, second only to the United States, in terms of
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), (Hendrischke, 2003:270). Thirdly, the PRC
has become the world's sixth largest trading economy in 2001, surpassing,
for instance, Canada in the amount of trade value. To put that into
perspective, while overall world trade fell by 4% in 2001, China's trade rose
by 7.5% in the same year, (Lardy, 2003:258). By any standard that is an
impressive statistic.
Despite these robust figures and impressive growth rates, China has
experienced some negative setbacks in 2003, especially considering the long-
term impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)epidemic that
plagued Hong Kong and Mainland China in the beginning of 2003. This
epidemic is estimated to impact on the 9.9% growth rate figure of 2003, by
leveling it off at about 7.5% to 7.4% towards the beginning of 2004 (The
Economist, 2003:2). This growth rate, however, should be sufficient to
maintain the momentum of the Chinese economy, during its current state of
transformation. The targeted GDP growth rate expected for the years 2001 to
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2005 is 7% per annum, as postulated in the Tenth Five Year Plan by the
CCP, (Hendriscke, 2003: 270; Zhu Rongji, 2003; Zeng Peiyan, 2003).
In terms of foreign trade and investment, the volume of China's foreign trade
exceeded $474.300m in 2000, through which it accumulated a foreign
currency reserve of about $218.698m in 2001, according to Hendrischke
(2003:278-279). It is an interesting indicator of the Chinese economy that
foreign enterprises contributed 52.1% of overall Chinese imports and 49.9%
of its exports, during the year 2000. Since the peak of FDI investment in
1998 of $40.398m, the FDI rate has slightly leveled off, yet this should be
countered, if not reversed, with the PRC's acceptance of and entrance into
the WTO. The main crux here is how fast and how thorough the PRC can
start to comply with WTO standards and regulations, and how successfully
it can implement them. The mere signatory accession to the WTO should
increase the FDI rate in China, initially with about 0.5% to 1.5% and by
2005 the PRC should entertain a FDI account exceeding $100 bn, (Liew,
2001:54).
China's current-account surplus will fall from $35.1 billion (2.7% of GDP) in
2002 to $17 billion (1.1% of GDP) in 2004, according to The Economist
(2003: 1). Hendriscke (2003:279) cushions this negative trend by claiming
that "China's foreign debt is extremely favourable, since its record in
repaying foreign debt is sound." Domestic debt, on the other hand, is far less
favourable. By 2001, government's debts amounted to approximately 80% to
100% of GDP. "Internationally a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60% is seen as a crisis
indicator," (Hendrischke, 2003: 272). It is specifically this debt-to-GDP of the
CCP government that should be closely monitored as an indicator to the
success or failure of the ongoing financial sector restructuring.
Entrance into the WTO 'club' should contribute an additional increase in
GDP growth of about 2% to 3% in the immediate future, despite the negative
effects of massive restructuring, short-term lay-offs and the retrenchment of
excessive personnel and employees of the public sector. It is reassuring to
see that China had a per capita purchasing power parity of $3.800 in 1999
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(CIAWorld Fact book, 2000), and this figure has incrementally risen since.
This indicates that the section of the Chinese population labeled the 'middle
class' has risen steadily in the PRC. The Economist (2002:3) estimates that
this portion of the population exceeds the mark of 300 million people. This
indicates that a burgeoning consumer potential exists in this section of the
Chinese population, especially in the Eastern Seaboard provinces, where
there is great profit potential for astute investors who have located
themselves in that market. SAB-Miller is one of them, as it has already
purchased breweries in these areas and is well advised to remain active in
these affluent provinces.
In terms of the economic policies and its socio-economic planning, the PRC
government has admitted that its most immediate focus should be on
agrarian reform and on the re-balancing of wealth between the booming
Eastern Seaboard provinces and the less prosperous inland areas, a plan
know as the "Great Opening of the West". The achievement of success in
these critical areas of concern will go a long way in mitigating the macro-
level socio-political and economic risk factors of the PRC. The primary focus
of this plan is to achieve economic growth, by allowing for the free
'marketisation' and the 'internationalisation' of its national economy, in
order to propel growth to the backward provinces of China, on par with the
growth rates in the affluent Eastern provinces. A more detailed account of
regional disparities, rural and urban unemployment, as well as the impact of
these issues on the investments plans of SAB-Miller will be given below.
Before these critical issues are explored in detail, it must first be explained
why FDI is such a critical issue for the investor as well as for the host
country.
2.2. Why Consider Investing In The First Place?
An a priori assumption of investment forecasting is that an increase in FDI
has a beneficial impact on the economy of a developing country. Countries
that attract large amounts of FDI will expenence more economic
development, and will, as a consequence, exhibit less macro- and micro
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economic and financial risk factors, as the host countries tailor and modify
their economies according to the established global rules. Fortunately for
investors allover the world, this assumption finds strong backing in recent
studies of international economic development, (Loungani & Razin, 2001);
(Mallampally & Sauvant, 1999) and (Ewe-Ghee, 2001). According to Ewe-
Ghee Lim (2001) a country with a liberal investment climate will greatly
benefit from FDI and it will experience a stronger spill-over of technology and
know-how, resulting in a contagion effect from the FDI into the host country,
by means of an extended clustering of business opportunities and through
market information. As such "the combination of cutting edge technology,
exporting into competitive world markets and the clustering of foreign
investor activity, will all tend to generate substantial spill-over and
externalities through strong backward linkages to indigenous suppliers,"
(Ewe-Ghee, 2001:5). Recent developments in China, such as its increased
share in FDI and its WTO accession, clearly show that the PRC is
establishing a fairly liberal investment climate, specifically in order to
capture these important technological spill-over for future economic
prosperity.
Yet, before we can focus on the risks inherent when investing in developing
countries, it is important to categorise and separate various types of FDI.
Unlike short-term capital inflows, such as portfolio investments and other
kinds of financial inflows (for instance bank loans), that are notoriously
volatile, FDI is far more committed to and much more focussed on longer-
term considerations. Unlike the herding behaviour of short-term capital
investors, FDI has proven to be remarkably resilient, especially in Asia
during the aftermath of the Asian economic crises of the late 90's. This
resilience is explained as the result of the advantages of and logic inherent in
a liberal investment climate and in the unrestricted flow of capital, especially
through FDI. Loungani and Razin (2001:6) state that "international capital
flows reduce the risk faced by owners by allowing them to diversify their
investments and lending. Secondly, the global integration of capital markets
can contribute to the spread of the best practices in corporate government,
accounting rules and legal traditions". Finally, Loungani and Razin claim
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that the global mobility of capital limits the ability of host governments to
institute bad policies. Therefore, for both the investors as for the host
country, FDI represents a win-win situation.
From the perspective of the firm, growth in FDI makes the world a relatively
safer, more integrated marketplace. From the side of the host government,
the presence and activities of foreign firms in the domestic market makes
equally sense. The dominant trend in developing countries (and arguably no
better example of this exists than in China) is one that is geared towards
instituting a policy framework, in such a way as to accommodate for FDI
growth. As Mallampaly and Sauvant (1999: 35-36) correctly indicate, there is
a strong correlation between the intensity of the supply and distribution
links between domestic firms and their foreign affiliates and the capabilities
of those domestic firms to capture the (in) direct spillover, which results from
FDI. This spillover is important especially in terms of the relevant transfer of
technologies, the building up of skills, innovative capacities, development of
more efficient managerial practices and easier access to international
marketing networks. The relationship between SAB-Miller and the PRC
government is a prime example of this statement. As such, SAB-Miller finds
itself in a strong position in terms of its access to the Chinese market, as will
be explained in detail below.
A strong word of caution is needed in this debate. As Loungani and Razin
(2001:8) clearly write "a high share in FDI of total capital inflows may be a
sign of a host country's weakness, rather than its strength." In terms of the
Chinese market, this is undoubtedly a correct warning. Yet, this should not
be misunderstood or even over-dramatised. Because of the relative
underdevelopment of the PRC as a market economy, due to historical
factors, foreign firms often preferred to invest directly into the PRC. The logic
behind this is that "FDI is more likely than any other form of capital flows to
take place in countries with missing or inefficient markets. In such settings,
foreign investors will prefer to operate directly in the market, rather than rely
on local financial markets, suppliers or legal arrangements," (Loungani &
Razin,2001:8-9).
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Another important determinant and effect of FDI in China has been the
emergence of Special Economic Zones (SEZ), through which the PRC
government created an important 'asset' in its quest to attract FDI. The
Chinese government has been competing with other developing countries for
the biggest share of FDI. The success rate of that competition is dependent
on the correct policy frameworks and the pursuit of new strategies to attract
FDI and outbid fellow developing competitors, in the race to capture
international finance. The Chinese government has been able to attract
foreign investors not only through a market-based policy framework, but
also because foreign companies "seek a combination of cost reduction, larger
markets and creative assets that can help them maintain a competitive
edge," (Mallampaly & Sauvant, 1999:37). On each of these points the PRC
scores fairly high. The creation of tax exemptions for foreign firms, the
establishment of clustered economic zones through SEZ's, the flexible labour
market practices, not to mention the immense size of its market, have all
propelled the PRC to the front of that international FDI race. As Mallampaly
and Sauvant (1999:36-37) conclude, it will be more critical in the future to
establish and develop "the distinctive combination of location-bound
advantages and especially 'created assets,' that a country or region can offer
to potential investors."
An important reason to why SAB-Millerhas considered investing in the PRC
is linked to the motivations found in horizontal (or market-seeking FDI) and
the vertical (or production-cost minimizing) motive of FDI, (Ewe-Ghee,
2001: 11). Horizontal FDI aims to reduce the costs involved in supplying the
Chinese market from its home country of South Africa. By duplicating its
existing breweries in the PRC or by joint ventures with Chinese breweries,
SAB-Miller can become more competitive by ways of closer market access,
anticipating changing consumer preferences, and by acquiring the ability to
respond more quickly to the changing investment climate.
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Secondly, the vertical FDI motive involves minimising production costs by
outsourcing the manufacturing process of the beer to local breweries. This
way, SAB-Miller can capitalise on lower input costs founded upon the
utilisation of a locally based, more economically viable workforce, for which
the PRC is renowned, if not notorious. Additionally, the presence of SAB-
Miller breweries in the booming provinces of China, especially in the SEZ's,
gives the company the benefit of being close to the production and
consumption patterns of these economic clusters. When taking both motives
of investment into account, it is clear that SAB-Miller has tailored its
investments plans according to both vertical and horizontal FDI motives. As
such, SAB-Miller has become a very astute investor and the result is that
SAB-Miller's investments have been highly lucrative so far and will remain so
in the medium-to long-term.
2.3. A New Window Of Opportunity?
Since December 2001, the PRC has committed itself officially to the WTO's
regulatory framework whereby the PRC has pledged to liberalise its economy
in order to increase investment and competition opportunities for foreign
and domestic businesses alike. However, due to the exceptional situation the
PRC finds itself in, juggling socialist and capitalist paradigms
simultaneously, their commitment to the WTO also elicits much scepticism
and disbelief. As Ka Zeng (2001:125) indicates, the PRC will have to adopt a
"new growth paradigm" with a clear and transparent commitment to
economic restructuring, market liberalisation and institution building, if it is
to sustain its economic growth. Yet due to the immense restructuring
process of the Chinese economy that cannot be realistically performed
overnight, the WTOmembers should be alert to delays and circumventions
of WTOstandards by the PRC. Authors Lague (2001), Gilley (2001), Murphy
(2001) and Fewsmith (2001), all acknowledge that in assessing the PRC's
transformation, one should rather abstain from pressing for full compliance
and acceptance. Rather one should pay attention to the issue of "acceptable
non-compliance [as] WTO members, in identifying clear parameters for
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acceptable behaviour, can playa constructive role in encouraging China to
accelerate its transition to full compliance," [Italics added] (Potter, 2001:
908).
Undeniably, the biggest responsibility lies not on the shoulders of the
international trading community but squarely on the shoulders of the PRC
government, to succeed in their restructuring process. Yet, despite the
fundamental volte face of the PRC government and its metamorphosis from
its erstwhile isolated communist past into a market-driven global player, it is
still hampered in its endeavour by the fact that there are deep structural
problems within the PRC. These structural problems, if not effectively
resolved, can become potential game-breakers for long-term investors and
for the necessary continuation of FDI. In order to understand the deeply
embedded structural problems of the PRC, one must carefully assess the
recent history of China's political economy. The following brief overview will
locate the PRC's current economic position, by analysing the major trends as
they have panned out, since the reforms initiated under Deng Xiao Ping in
1978.
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3. TRENDS OF THE PRC'S POLITICAL ECONOMY
3.1. DENG XIAO PING'S INCREMENTAL REFORMS
When Deng Xiao Ping initiated the reformation process of the PRC's
economy, he was faced with an internationally isolated, underdeveloped and
highly centralised country. With laudable foresight Deng Xiao Ping
concluded that the PRC had to implement socio-economic and political
reforms if they were to modernise, prosper or even survive in the future.
With the benefit of absolute obedience, he dropped the centrally planned
economy in favour of a more market driven one in the hope of propelling
China's economic development to new heights. The amazing economic
development of South Korea and the other 'Asian Tiger' economies during
that era surely provided the PRCwith a guiding beacon and some additional
incentives. Their unfortunate economic crises in the late 1990's should have
added some additional economic lessons to the CCP too.
Socially, the reforms shattered one of the most resilient features of the PRC,
namely the tenet of the "Iron Rice Bowl", providing social security, from
cradle to grave, to all of its (state-employed) citizens". To this day, laid-off
workers from State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) are still classified and
referred to as Xiagang workers, who, though unemployed, still receive some
sort of benefit from their previous employers. In 1999, these urban workers
numbered approximately 10 millions.
Economically, Deng Xiao Ping's initial reforms provided a 'win-win' situation
for all sections of society. This highly prosperous era lasted until about
4 For more detail see: N.C. Hughes.1998. Smashing the Iron Rice Bowl, p.67-77.
5 S. Wang. zgOO. The Social and Political Implications of China's WTO Membership, p.382.
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1993. In those 15 years, the Chinese economy doubled its per Capita income
in only 9 years, compared to the USAwho needed 47 years to complete that
same featv. According to the World Bank (2001: xiii) the rural population in
China in 1978 living under the 1$ per day breadline was about 260 million.
During the 1990's that number came down to 106 million or roughly 11.5%
of the total rural population. According to former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji
(2003: viii) that number is now even lower, estimated at 28.2 million. This
official figure, on the other hand, relies on a less stringent breadline
benchmark.
Politically, the new era heralded an improved governing system. In 1980,
Deng Xiao Ping produced his declaration on "Some Principles On the Party's
Internal Politics," a document intended to limit internal strife and resistance
against the structural reforms. It limited the duration of party positions to a
two-term length, and it enforced a strict retirement age. It reduced intra-
party conflicts and it augmented the qualification and educational standards
for the members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the National
Peoples Congress (NPC).This has propelled a new breed of technocrats into
positions of power, a political development that is in line with the needs of
China, as its government is faced with the ever-growing complexities of
managing a developing country of such vast proportions.
3.1.2. Consolidating The Reforms
With the demise of Deng Xiao Ping in 1993, Jiang Zemin continued on the
élan of his predecessor. According to Gilboy and Heginbotham (2001:29)
China's international trade had quadrupled from $112 billion in 1989 to
$474 billion in 2000! Though these figures are impressive by themselves,
they obscure the deep underlying structural problems besieging the PRC,
and which may, if left unresolved, hamper or even reverse China's socio-
economic development.
6 M. Pei. 1998. Is China Democratising?, p.74.
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.Firstly, the PRC has to bridge a tremendous distributive impasse between its
prosperous industrial coastal regions and its severely underdeveloped
agricultural regions in China's West and South-West. According to Wang
(2000:375) these distributive conflicts may "divert attention, energy and
resources from productive uses to bargaining over the distribution of rents
and burdens of globalisation." Secondly, these conflicts might create "sub-
optimal investment levels," especially in the regions where sustained
investment is crucial. And lastly, these conflicts might cause severe social
disruptions, inhibit consensus building and undermine the formulation of
clear and critically-needed developmental policies. Clearly such a scenario
will undermine the potential of SAB-Millerto reach out to the full extent of
the Chinese market, as well as undermine the implementation of
developmental policies of the central government. As will be shown later, the
CCP has enticed investors into those developing regions with preferential
policies in order to ameliorate the situation and bring these regions up to
speed.
What makes these regional disparities so important is the interrelated
complexity of the matter and the impact those disparities might have on
future economic development. The inter-provincial disparities are widening
continuously, with the disparities already being extremely large. For instance
Shanghai's per capita GDP was about 4.5 times the national average, while
the Western province of Guizhou was measured at only 37% of that same
national average". In terms of growing national economic inequality, the PRC
had a GINI coefficient of 0.32 in 1980 compared to a coefficient of 0.43
towards the late 1990's, while some sources place it higher at 0.59, (Wang,
2003: 41; Conaky, 2000:2). The implication of this is that Chinese society is
exhibiting a growing tendency of highly uneven distribution of wealth. With
the GINI coefficient growing as it is, the population is being fragmented
between those who have an excessive amount of wealth as opposed to those
who have barely sufficient. This trend is highly worrisome.
7M. Pei. 1998. Is China Democratising?, p.389.
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The complexity of the matter is that the disparities are compounded by
social, structural, ethnic and environmental factors, all compounding and
obscuring a swift resolution of the discrepancies. The decentralisation of
fiscal policies and the marginalisation of the poorer provinces severely
weakens the national government's capacity to extract the necessary taxes
and, concurrently, to efficiently re-invest these taxes in the development of
the struggling hinterland provinces. Rampant corruption, bureaucratic
mismanagement and agricultural inefficiencies further compound the
underdevelopment of those Western regions. The result is a massive influx of
unskilled labour from the countryside into the already overcrowded cities of
the prosperous coastal regions, causing hyper-urbanisation. If this
urbanisation continues to occur without a controlled governmental policy, it
may well become a trend which could exacerbate social tensions, especially if
the urban economic growth rates are insufficient to not only alleviate urban
poverty but also to absorb, in as much as possible, the massive influx of
peasants.
The implications of this trend for SAB-Miller are twofold. The only solution
for the CCP government to remedy this growing social malcontent is to lure
and entice FDI into China in order to absorb as much as possible of the
unemployed labour force. Therefore, the CCP has relaxed its restrictive
investment climate tremendously. This implies that SAB-Millerwill benefit
from preferential policies designed to attract and trap FDI in the PRC. On the
other hand, in a social climate that is in a full transition, mood swings,
social unrest and protests are not to be ruled out. Though, the overall
outlook for the PRC is positive, these social developments are to be
monitored at all times by SAB-Miller.
3.2. RECENT POLITICALDEVELOPMENTS
3.2.1. Continuity of Government
Besides the numerous macro-economic risk factors, which pertain to all
foreign enterprise, such as the liability of the financial sector and the high
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levels of non-performing loans, political and social reforms are the most
critical issues to the evolution of a liberal investment climate in the PRC.
Akhter and Lusch (1987:89-92) define political risk as "the manifestation of
the internal adjustment process within a society, whereby a society, as a
social structure, reconfigures itself. Political risk is an inherent adjustment
process which prevails in every society in varying degrees." Clearly, the
critical factor is the ability of the PRC government to allow this
reconfiguration to be exacted so that the socio-economic climate in the PRC
is conducive for business.
Despite the massive restructuring of numerous redundant SOE's and the
resulting lay-offs they (will) generate, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
still aims to keep a strong hand over the PRC in terms of its political
objectives and its social agenda. The major, as of yet, unresolved question is
whether the PRC can continue to develop its neo-liberal economic policies
without any substantialliberalisation or democratisation of its socio-political
structure. Differently put, can the economic growth rate be maintained
without allowing for any genuine democratic participation by its citizens?
The number of unemployed workers in urban and rural areas is expected to
swell with China committing itself to the WTO framework, and by China's
continuing economic re-organisation. In order to cope with the increasing
societal discontent that flows from this re-organisation, the CCP aims to
both liberalise the economy and to a small extent civil society, yet
simultaneously maintain a firm grip on the state apparatus, through limited
public participation. The long-term viability of this strategy is still heavily
debated, Gilley (2003), Wang (2003), Pei (1998, 2001, 2003), Miles (2002)
and He (2003).
Politically, the PRC is still highly centralised implying that the Communist
Party-run state exhibits a remarkable stability in terms of governmental
transitions and in terms of the stability of its socio-economic policies. In
November 2002, at the 16th Party Congress, PRC President Jiang Zemin
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stepped down in favour of Hu Jintao. Despite this peaceful and smooth
transition, the leadership of the PRC is still perceived to be "a dictatorship of
an ever-expanding circle of a self-selecting elite," (Miles, 2002: 5). Yet, this
does not necessarily imply the formation of a negative forecast or as an
important political risk factor; maybe just the opposite, at least for the short-
term.
In his study of the new generation of political leaders in the PRC, Li Cheng
(2000: 13) argues, "this generation of leaders is more diversified than
previous generations in terms of formative experiences, political solidarity,
ideological conviction, career paths and occupational background." Freshly
elected PRC President Hu Jintao is flanked by his generational colleagues,
the most important of which are Zeng Qinghong, Wu Bangguo and newly
elected Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. These men, Li Cheng (2000:23)
concludes, are "compared to their predecessors, far more flexible and less
dogmatic in responding to the socio-economic pressures and political
demands within the country."
Yet, despite their more pragmatic approach, these Fourth Generation leaders
are still negatively inclined towards opening up the country's democratic
potential. Favouring incremental changes over radical reforms, the new
Chinese leadership maintains the absolute rule of the CCP over the PRC
state. As Minxin Pei (1998:79) stated, the PRC government clearly views the
"opening up of political process to mass democratic participation, as a recipe
for chaos." This view might very well hold a grain of truth. In such an
enormous country, at such a critical time in its evolution, stability in terms
of policy, agenda and implementation is of the utmost importance. Certainty
in terms of its policy framework commitments, which can be expected as
long as the CCP remains in power and in control, will go a great deal in
assuring investors and analysts, as well as safeguard the steady inflow of
FDI.
Yet it should not be overlooked that the PRC is continuing to plot along a
dangerous route of opening up economically, while rigidly holding on to
political absolutism. A result of this dichotomy is that the PRC is "a non-
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adaptive, brittle state that is unable to cope with an increasingly complex
and robust society," according to Gilboy and Heginbotham (2001:26).
Despite the incremental experiments with democratic elections in villages
and townships, the PRC, on the political front, remains a highly centralised
state. The lack of popular participation and legitimisation from the bottom-
up clearly undermines the democratic capabilities of the PRC. This is most
visible in such things as taxation and national policy implementation. The
result of it all is the accumulation of all kinds of strains and stresses that
might lead to the possibility of a chaotic episode in China's political
governance structures. Minxin Pei (2002: 101) has focussed on three main
measures to identify the breakdown of traditional CCP leadership. Firstly,
the CCP is experiencing "a shrinkage of its organisational penetration."
Secondly, as a result of the former, the CCP is losing its ideological appeal
and authority amongst the masses, who feel alienated. Finally, Minxin Pei
(2002) believes that through widespread corruption and nepotism, the CCP
is losing not only obedience from the masses, it is also loosing its internal
discipline.
3.2.2. Corruption
The topic of corruption in the PRC is not only a highly contentious issue, it
has also become a very public one. As stated earlier, the decentralised fiscal
structure of the PRC gives ample reason and opportunity for self-enrichment
by local and provincial governments. At present, corruption in the PRC is
measured at "the equivalent of anywhere from 10 to 20 percent of GDP,"
(Gilley, 2003:23). The relevance of corruption to foreign investors and SAB-
Miller in particular, is that, according to Mauro (2002:2), corruption "affects
investment and economic growth, as it alters the composition of government
spending, often to the detriment of future economic growth."
Because of the relative weakness of institutional and legal frameworks in the
PRC, the CCP still maintains a relatively tight control over the governing
elites at state and provincial level. The CCP still appoints its 'cronies' to the
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most valuable posts, based solely on political affiliation and not necessarily
on merit. As such, the power of the CCP is still very much entrenched at all
levels of the state. Yet with the liberalisation of the economy, these political
appointments are increasingly supplemented by the appointments of
members of the bourgeois middle class, specifically by affluent capitalists, a
new dominant force in the Chinese economy.
As such, Susan Lawrence (2001:40) warns of the emergence of a "business
mafia" or more broadly of the "corporatisation of the Chinese state." A well-
founded fear is that these domestic capitalists will use their power and
leverage to skew the free workings of a capitalist market, by arranging state
protection and favouritism for their particular enterprises. These fears are
specifically relevant to the more autonomous and parochial provinces, far
removed from Beijing's oversight, (Lawrence 2001; Murphy, 2001). This
corporate protectionism will be dealt with later when the micro-level risk
factors for SAB-Millerare outlined, further on in this report.
The causes of corruption are often found in the low wages of civil servants,
in the priee control mechanisms installed in the Chinese economy, in the
intra-provincial trade barriers, and in sociological factors, such as nepotism
and the guanxi network system. The interpersonal networking system of
China, called guanxi, is an indispensable cultural feature of business and
governance in the PRC. As Johnson (1997:272) states, "corruption arises, to
a significant extent, out of, and is symptomatic of, these tensions between
the definition and scope of acceptable business practices. Guanxi
relationships are a basis of privileged access." [Italics added].
It is in this context that gift-giving and people's networking should be
viewed. By giving entrepreneurs direct access to important government
officials, business can be conducted in a Chinese market that is still growing
and adapting to free market principles and meritocracy. According to
Johnson (1997:272) the frequency of corruption could also be seen as a
relatively positive process for specific businesses. His theory states that
corruption, or less specifically 'gift-giving,' is a sort of "social lubricant,"
between business partners, provided of course, that with time and effort this
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institutionalised corruption gets replaced by more transparent and
normative business practices. Yet for the time being 'gift-giving' or just plain
corruption are issues foreign businesses cannot avoid when operating in the
PRC. This thorny issue affects SAB-Milleras well and it should be handled
with care.
Precisely this trend towards better normative business practices is gaining
ground in the PRC. The Chinese government has been making great strides
towards the clamping down on corruption and by publicly shaming the
corrupt officials. As former PRC President Jiang Zemin stated in 2000,
"severe punishment must be inflicted on those who have defied the law and
committed crimes. No matter how high their posts, they will receive their
punishment," (Rongxia, 2000: 13). However, despite this official tough stand
on corruption, Bruce Gilley (2003:22) is far more reserved in his
assessments of the PRC's newly discovered anti-corruption stance. As he
states, "the processing of high level corruption cases in the Party remains a
matter of political expediency, a smokescreen for factional battles at the top."
With the traditional cultural feature of guanxi, the occurrence of corruption
in the PRC will never be completely eliminated. And as stated earlier, this
cultural feature IS as much a gateway to the right contacts and
opportunities, as it is a drain on efficient resource allocation and merit-
based evaluations. Additionally, these privileged sources of contact might
become sources of embarrassment for a company, if their business dealings
are publicly revealed and thus shamed. This is an important point to
remember for SAB-Miller,as this constitutes a micro-risk factor.
3.2.3. State Incapacitation
The deep-levelled entrenchment of corruption and the inability of the central
government to effectively counter it is a clear sign of the weakness of the
PRC state. According to Shaoguang Wang (2003:38) the PRC has a "capacity
deficit," causing the steady yet incremental disintegration of the PRC. With
the GINIcoefficient hovering around 0.43 in 2002, compared to 0.32 in 1980
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(Wang, 2003:41), the CCP is steadily losing its power and its resources.
Wang (2003:40) distinguishes two distinct phases in the socio-economic
development of China. From the start of the liberalisation under Deng Xiao
Ping in 1978 to 1993, there was a "win-win" situation for all segments of
society. Yet from 1993 to the present, the economic liberalisation is
providing a clear distinction between the winners and the losers. In 2003, for
instance, "China has forecast an increase in unemployment of 0.5% to 4.5%,
equal to more than 7 million people, although some officials estimate that
the figure is much higher," (Business Report, 2003). Since 1998 over 30
million workers have lost their jobs in the closing down of SOE's and an
estimated 20 million urban job-seekers will enter the labour market each
year, (Pei, 2003:75). Now the question is, can the PRC market create
sufficient space and employment for these urban and rural job seekers?
Despite its capacity constraints, the PRC government has gone to great
lengths in order to re-establish itself as the prime organiser of society. As
mentioned above, the PRC has a decentralised tax structure, but "while the
1993-94 fiscal and tax reforms introduced elements of fiscal federalism, the
overall reforms were clearly intended to enlarge the central government's
share of total government revenue," according to Yang (2003:45). Through its
reforms, the share of the total budget revenue of the central government
levelled off at 52.4% in 2001 and the total budgetary revenue as a
percentage of GDP rose from a low of 10.7% in 1995, to 17.1% in 2001,
(Yang, 2003:44). This reverse process of "bringing the center back in" is a
necessary step in order to address regional disparities, underdevelopment
and poverty III China, according to Chung (2001: 121). By aiding the
development of horizontal and vertical cooperative networks between
provinces, the central government can play "an indispensable role by raising
the levels of regional specialisation by lowering inter-provincial market
barriers through its macro-policy regulations," (Chung, 2001: 148).
The process of "bringing the center back in" is an inevitable and necessary
process for the PRC government. In terms of strengthening the state, it
would do well in boosting political, economic and cultural nationalism
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(Schubert, 2001: 150), if it IS to avoid the mounting challenges to state
authority through the "sub-institutional and socio-psychological
transformations in the periphery, as a warning signal of the waning
regulatory and ideological supremacy of the CCP." A clear SIgn of this
emancipation of the periphery is given by Chung (2001:141). Instead of
adopting a passive attitude in economic empowerment or instead of just
waiting for Beijing to institute preferential policies, periphery provinces are
increasingly organising themselves into powerful lobby groups to promote
their own needs and agendas.
The most relevant of these associations are the "Regional Economic
Coordination Association of Southwest China and the Shanxi-Gansu-
Sichuan Economic Cooperation Zone," to name but a few. Through these
associations the 'central vs periphery' relationships are much more likely to
yield beneficial outcomes in terms of market integration, relaxation of tariff
barriers and other impediments to the functioning of free market trade. By
doing so, the CCP should strengthen these regional institutions and
relationships, as they are sorely needed in order to build a cohesive state
and a unified national front.
This rebuilding and the re-invigoration of the CCP state is a prerequisite for
the survival of the PRC. Democracy "precisely because it allows the widest
possible competition for political power and therefore institutionalises
uncertainty demands a highly effective state that can keep the nation's
business moving forward despite political turnovers," (Wang, 2003:41). The
demise of the CCP authoritarianism could very well lead to the total
fragmentation of the Chinese market and even lead to territorial
disintegration. Therefore, the institutionalisation of mechanism that aids the
development of a unified state is a prerequisite for successful economic
activities. In this light, the process of "bringing the center back in" is a
beneficial and highly desirable one, for domestic and international investors
alike.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
32
4. STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC LIABILITIES
4.1. STATE-SECTORRESTRUCTURING
4.1.1. Financial Institutions and Liquidity Risk
Despite massive economic improvements in the last two decades the PRC
still faces a daunting restructuring process. A great part of China's economy
has been kept artificially afloat through the bailing out of State-Owned
Enterprises running at great losses, "resulting in poor management,
overstaffing, high debt, outdated products and technologies, excessive social
welfare burdens and high tax rates," according to Heytens and Karacadag
(2001:4). By artificially propping up these state-run businesses and keeping
them afloat, the People's Bank of China and other state commercial banks
(SCB's), have issued many non-performing loans (NPL's).At present, these
NPL's are measured to stand at a whopping 25%-50%, depending on private
or public figures. These NPL's are clear indicators of the economic risks in
the PRC. Several authors such as Holz (2001), Wall (1998) and Dernberger
(2001) and Lague (2001) have all cautioned against the possible implosion of
the financial system in the PRC, potentially causing highly disruptive
shockwaves. As Holz (2001:367) warns the investor:
UA continuous decline in state net worth is a risky strategy as trust in the state banking
system could wane and lead to widespread bank runs. The economic and political
implications of a collapsing financial system, wiping out a large part of accumulated
household savings will undoubtedly be severe."
David Wall (1998:7) clearly states that the mam function of a banking
system is "to provide a mechanism for financial intermediation, to transfer
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the savings of deposit holders to borrowers, who can use the assets
productively." Since the Chinese have a high savings ratio, on average more
than 40%, the banks should be in a good position to extend credit lines and
investment assets. Even in the more underdeveloped rural provinces savings
ratios have increased from less than 10% in 1980 to over 67% in 1998
(Hendrischke, 2003: 272). Therefore, the CCP has extended the prerogatives
of State Commercial Banks (SCB) in order to strengthen the
commercialisation of their lending operations. According to Heytens and
Karacadag (2001:4) the reforms were initiated to diversify the opportunities
for lending by the public at these SCB's, "while taking steps to commercialise
[them] and hold SCB's accountable for their own operations and financial
results."
The critical factors for the success of these reforms is the continuation of
public trust in the state banking sector and sustained governmental
oversight in the reformation process of the financial sector. If, however, the
trust in and the control over the financial sector were to crumble, the stage
could be set for the "Lardy Dilemma," (Wall, 1998:9). This dilemma states
that when the people lose trust in the banking sector, they will en masse
withdraw their savings, causing a run on the banks. This will then lead to
the crumbling of the already fragile banking sector. As Wall (1998:9)
concludes "inflation will be the result and the banking system will face the
sort of crisis that has already occurred in other Asian economies." This is a
sobering thought and an area of great concern to SAB-Miller's current and
future investments.
The tensions faced by the banking sector come form two major sources.
Firstly, the banking sector is still slowly gaining its feet in a market
economy. Concretely, this means that most staff and personnel of the
banking sector are not as highly qualified as their developed nation
counterparts, resulting in a much slower and less efficient banking service.
Secondly, the decentralisation of the Chinese market also affects the
banking sector. Often, David Wall (1998:8) claims, the banks do not really
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understand "whose interests the local branches are supposed to serve. Local
authorities have a good deal of influence over local branches," especially in
the domain of employment, political influence and career development of the
banking staff. As such, the banking sector has become a strategic puppet
between the periphery and the centre, at the detriment of the national
economy, on which all depend. Given the size of the Chinese state, divided
into numerous provinces, the resulting power struggles between the centre
and the periphery are inevitable. As such, the financial sector is certainly in
a precarious position.
When in the past inefficient SOE's required financial injections or bail-out
loans, the banking sector always acted as a prop-up, pressurized either by
the central or the local government. However, in the last few years, it has
become clear that the PRC government is increasingly abandoning its
ideological claim over the financial sector, as well as over its SOE's, resulting
in many of those SOE's closing down operations. Yet despite these hands-off
governmental policies, the entire banking system in China is in need of a
drastic overhaul, if it is to function according to WTO standards. As Potter
(2001: 602) concludes his analysis of the PRC financial sector:
"In order to comply with the requirements of the WTO, China has begun a wide-ranging
campaign of revising existing legislation and administrative regulations. Substantive law in
many economic sectors, including customs, foreign exchange, taxation, intellectual property,
enterprise law, bankruptcy and pricing and other areas will need to be revised to accord with
WTO requirements. "
4.1.2. State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)
In his review of the bankruptcies of China's state sector enterprises, Carsten
Holz (2001:367) touches upon the degree of difficulty one faces in analysing
the economic performances of these SOE's. Some of these state-owned
companies deliberately falsify their scorecards in order to hide embarrassing
financial losses, or else, in order to bolster their image to the central or local
governments. Some SOEs located in particular provinces underreport their
earnings in order to escape excessive levies and taxes by local governments,
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a direct result of the decentralised fiscal structure and the 'centre-to-
periphery' competition. This caveat is issued by Heytens and Karacadag
(2001:5), who specifically refer to the difficulties inherent in interpreting the
corporate financial data, produced by SOE's. They claim that "enterprise
accounting and reporting practices need to be strengthened so that lenders
can make accurate assessments of the true financial conditions and risk
profiles." With this in mind, the analysis of SOE (in)efficiency is indeed a
daunting task.
In his analysis of state-sector reforms, Kenneth deWoskin (2001) clarifies the
reasons why the progress made in SOE reforms is so critical for foreign
investors, in our case for SAB-Miller. Firstly, with the proliferation of locally
based breweries, SAB-Miller can investigate the health, productivity and
viability of certain state-owned breweries, in order to consider entering into
joint ventures or partnerships or in order to complete any acquisitions of
existing companies. Secondly, monitoring the emergence of market-driven
SOE's is paramount to the assessment of the degree of competitive forces in
China. As deWoskin (2001: 14) states "the more SOE's reform, the more they
can benefit from the natural advantages of being domestic." Lastly, the
direction and pace of the reforms of SOE's, specifically in the beer industry,
is a clear indication of the maturation and/ or saturation of the PRC market.
All three are clearly important aspects for SAB-Miller and each point will
affect the promulgation of investment strategies in the PRC.
Since 1993, there has been a measurable improvement in the way state
sector enterprises are run. Improvements in terms of property rights
regulations, obedience to market forces, separation of powers between
management and government and a remarkable increase in the quality of
management skills all contributed to the rise of a more modern enterprise
system in the PRC. According to Chen Jiagui (1998:14-15) the main focus of
SOE reforms lies in the continuation of either letting redundant SOE's file for
bankruptcy or by allowing small to medium sized SOE's to "merge, annex or
co-operate across boundaries of regions, departments and ownership." By
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allowing for the survival of the fittest, the most adaptive SOE's should be
able to remain in business and this should strengthen the quality of free-
market competition. An increase of FDI in specific fields will further aid the
development of international managerial practices and more efficient
resource allocation, as discussed above.
The main problem of bankruptcies and SOE mergers is the dismissal of
superfluous employees, especially when keeping in mind the absence of
social security nets for these employees. According to Jiagui (1998:14)
"statistics show that about 20% of the workers in SOE's are superfluous." It
is unlikely that these can remain employed in their current positions for
much longer and this does not bode well for the precarious socio-political
status quo. The critical factors, therefore, lie in the ability of the PRe
government to attract FDI from abroad In order to create new job
opportunities, and in its commitment to building adequate social security
nets, that will stem the tide of anger at the rising employment figures.
4.1.3. Unemployment and Social Safety Nets
In their evaluation of the reform process, Feltenstein and Nsouli (2001:34)
argue that the incremental reform trajectory chosen by the PRe is a more
beneficial one. They claim that by deliberately choosing a gradual approach
over a "Big Bang" approach, the PRe is able to "maximise inter-temporal
social welfare, taking into account the social discount rate, subject to
various financial and structural constraints." More clearly put, this means
that through generating the necessary amount of economic growth, the PRe
can sustain its process of shedding state sector employment, as long as the
private sector can absorb the retrenched workers, and as long as the state is
willing and able to provide for a social security net for those who fallout of
the working economy.
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This is collaborated by Zhu Rongji (2003: vi) and Elisabeth Croll (1999), with
the latter maintaining that despite the market reforms and the liberalisation
of the economy, the state should still remain the primary care-taker for the
disadvantaged, who find themselves unemployed or unemployable because
of the economic reforms. As Croll (1999:673) states "social stability and
political authority are dependent on the government's ability to reform the
social welfare provisioning." The CCP should attempt to continue with the
practices of social insurance, social services and the social relief tenets that
it employed through its SOE's, especially for those Xiagang workers, who
have lost their jobs and income, but who are still (albeit technically)
employed by the state. Croll (1999:681) further describes the social welfare
provisioning as a key priority on the national reform agenda not merely in
order to meet the changing requirements of the market economy, "but also
because its very absence is impeding the emergence of a market economy
and [thereby] raising the spectre of economic stagnation and social unrest."
Athar Hussain (2000:8) has identified that the trend of rising urban poverty
has accelerated since 1993, when the second part of the Deng Xiao Ping's
economic reform process started. Before 1993, the PRC's economic reforms
were largely a win-win situation, but since then, the reforms have clearly
started to separate the winners from the losers. As he states, "the official
head count of the urban population below the poverty line is around 13
million, which implies an urban poverty rate of about 3.3% to 3.5%." The
cause of this urban poverty lies in the sharp increase in lay-offs during the
reforms of redundant SOE's, in the erosion of the enterprise-based social
welfare system and lastly, in the relative inability of the central government
to develop a new social safety net for the unemployed and the unemployable.
Unfortunately, this trend of lay-offs due to restructuring will persist for the
short-term future. The critical factor in this restructuring process is the
ability of the private sector to create new job opportunities and by doing so,
snatch up as many of the unemployed as possible. Athar Hussain (2000: 11)
adds that the immediate concern for poverty relief lies in the ability of the
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central government to allocate enough budget revenues to city governments,
so that they can create and implement a city-based health insurance and
poverty relief scheme for the urban unemployed. As Minxin Pei (2002:204)
correctly points out "China's health system ranked 144th worldwide, placing
it among the bottom quartile of World Health Organisation members." This
information is relevant as, according to John Chan (2001:5), "the UN
predicts 10million HIVcases by 2010 in China, two thirds of which will be
located in the rural areas." We have already noted that a mass exodus
towards the cities is already under way, so these concerns are not to be
taken lightly. Clearly, the government needs to augment its health and social
services expenditure to cities and provinces in order to manage the
potentially devastating effects of an eroding social safety net.
Yet admittedly, this outcome depends squarely on the ability and
commitment of the central government to free those resources for the relevant
cities. At present approximately 100million workers and employees
participate in some form of unemployment insurance programmes and
1.37million people drew unemployment insurance benefits, according to
Hendrischke (2003:274). The continuation of these social welfare
programmes however, rely on the ability and commitment of the Chinese
government. Despite the institutional commitment to these expenditures,
their verbal commitments are seriously jeopardised by the incapacitation of
the PRC state because of its fragmented and inefficient fiscal system, as will
be explained later on.
4.2. MARKET FRAGMENTATION
4.2.1. The Agricultural Sector
As mentioned above, the CCP has committed itself to restructuring its
agrarian sector, particularly in light of its accession to the WTO. According
to Lardy (2003:255) the Development Research Center of China's State
Council has calculated that with the accession to the WTOover 11.lmillion
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jobs will be lost in the agricultural sector. The PRC has since time
immemorial been a self-sufficient agrarian producer, but since the
liberalisation of the economy, agriculture as a share of GDP has declined
continuously. In 1980, it was still 30% as opposed to less than 17% in 1999,
(Hendrischke, 2003:274). In terms of its total national labour force, however,
the PRC still has 53.6% employed in the rural sector. Clearly, this decline in
profitability of the agricultural sector and the resulting exacerbation of rural
poverty will lead directly to an increase in social discontent and also to
hyper-urbanisation.
On a positive note, Hendriscke (2003:274) indicates that despite the decline
in rural sector profitability, there has been a marked increase in township
and village enterprises (TVE),a sector outside official government control. It
is calculated that by 1998, these TVE employed 125 million people, or about
28% of the total rural labour force. According to Nicolas Lardy (2003: 265)
354 million people were employed in the rural sector in 2000. Yet, with the
rise of TVE's and the "Opening up of the West," the CCP aims to gradually
reduce these numbers to more economically viable levels. Lardy (2003: 265)
concludes that "China has already absorbed a very substantial portion of the
costs of restructuring its economy, necessary to operate successfully in a
more competitive, global environment." As such, Lardy indicates that the
shrinking of the agricultural sector is a beneficial and irreversible trend for
the development of the PRC.
4.2.2. Fiscal Decentralisation and Provincialism
When Deng Xiao Ping initiated the restructuring process of the PRe, the
erstwhile highly centralised Chinese market has essentially become
internally fragmented and susceptible to market distortions as a result of
this decentralisation process. With the reforms much economic and political
power has been devolved towards provincial governments, who have received
a certain amount of autonomy in terms of establishing prices, tariffs and
other trade-distortion barriers. The reasons for this devolution of power can
be extracted from three main developments, which have characterised the
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development of the Chinese state since 1978. According to Yifu Lin and Liu
(2000:4), the first of these developments is that the economic reforms
allowed and pressed for much greater involvement of non-State Owned
Enterprises, such as private firms, joint venture-ships with foreign
companies, township enterprises and foreign enterprises to freely contend in
the growing market economy.
Concurrently, the Chinese state has been shedding the heavy financial
burden of inefficient SOE's to the benefit of those locally-based and
efficiently run non-SOE's, according to the logic of the market and the
survival of the fittest. Secondly, with these economic reforms came the
logical result of extending political autonomy to provinces, especially in the
areas of decision-making and accountability. Finally, the outcome of these
reforms clearly exhibited that the process of fiscal decentralisation allowed
local governments to take much more control and responsibility over their
economic performances. With their fate and prosperity in their own hands,
provinces started to take on more responsibilities for economic growth, and
as such started benefiting the PRC's economy as a whole.
However, this process of power devolution has been compounded by two,
often antagonistic, types of decentralisation. On the one hand, one gets
administrative decentralisation, where political power is transferred to lower
tiers of government, in which there are clear winners and losers in terms of
decision-making power, settled in favour of the local governments vis a vis
the central leadership in Beijing. Secondly, one has market decentralisation,
where the market, at least in theory, should allocate resources efficiently
according to the workings of free market logic. In practice, however, the
newly acquired administrative decision-making powers, in the hands of
provincial governments, often block the rational implementation of a market-
based economy in favour of local protectionism and provincial parochialism.
It is because of this negative development that the CCP has attempted to
check the devolution of power, as to contain it within acceptable boundaries.
The success of this 'containment policy' and the success of re-establishing a
unified tax and trade regime throughout the entire PRC is an important
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evolution for SAB-Miller, as it will affect the level of SAB-Miller's access to
the entire Chinese consumer population.
As Breslin (1999: 17) indicates "inter-provincial trade remains remarkably
low as a result of provincial authorities acting to protect their local
producers." An astonishing example of this local protectionism is given by
Gilley (2001: 17) who writes that a bottle of Beijing's Yanjing Beer, which
sells for the equivalent of 18 cents in the capital, will cost about $1 in the
remote Sichuan Province, as a result of provincial fees and taxes. Bruce
Gilley (2001: 18) explains the origins of these provincial rivalries by linking
the evaluation of local cadres by the CCP, on the basis of the economic
growth record of their assigned locality. As such, "local authorities are
obsessed with local GDP growth rates (the leading criteria for evaluating
party cadre performance) and so make full use of their administrative powers
to assist local producers, sectors and industries."
On top of that, local governments continued to carve out their own economic
fiefdoms vis a vis the central government. For instance, in terms of the fiscal
rights and duties, assigned as the prerogative of the provincial government,
most taxes are collected and calculated by provincial branches of
government. As Breslin (1999: 19) narrates "through creative accountancy
local authorities could underreport their real wealth and thus reduce the tax
revenue they passed on to the central authorities." These perfidious and
disjointed practices are continuing to undermine the equal development,
evolution and distribution of prosperity throughout the entire PRC.
At present, the PRC has 27 relatively autonomous provincial governments,
as well as numerous special Export Processing Zones (EPZ) and Special
Economic Zones (SEZ), such as the Shanghai Economic Region. Because of
these particular economic zones, the PRC central government has been
unable to draft, implement and control policy from the centre, leading to a
situation, in which provinces and regions compete against each other in
such a way, that it actually undermines the overall economic growth
potential of the PRC. The result of the Deng Xiao Ping's economic reforms
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led to "the fragmentation of the domestic market and the distortion of
regional production away from patterns of comparative advantage," (Young,
2000:1091).
This ongoing process of power devolution towards the provinces has resulted
in the establishment of local fiefdoms, more concerned with the economic
growth of their province, regardless to the logic of comparative advantage.
With the central government relinquishing control over prices, tariffs,
outputs and budgets, "these functions have been taken up, albeit in a less
systematic fashion, by local governments. Thus, China has moved from
having one central plan to having many mutually competitive central plans,"
(Young, 2000: 1129).
Yet, despite this rather unfavourable trend of power devolution, some
analysts claim that fiscal decentralisation has "made a significant
contribution to economic growth, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that fiscal decentralisation can increase economic efficiency," (YifuLin and
Liu, 2000: 18). Their reasons for investigating this hypothesis are based on
the assumptions that local governments have better access to relevant
information concerning the presence or absence of market opportunities in
their location. Secondly, through their autonomy the local governments will
be pressed by their constituents to perform responsibly and adequately.
Finally, the principle of power devolution, or more accurately, the
empowerment of local governments, should incite entrepreneurial
dynamism, provide incentives for opportunism and strengthen personal
involvement by local officials to spur on economic growth. As Yifu Lin and
Liu (2000: 16) correctly state:
"Forprovincial governments the incentives to invest are stronger under a decentralised fiscal
system than under a centralised one, because the former affords provincial governments a
greater share of returns that may be generated by additional investment."
Despite the sound argument of pro-decentralisation, the most critical
question revolves around whether or not national economic integration is a
prerequisite for successful international economic integration? As Jiawen
Yang (2002: 35) correctly writes "a fragmented national economy may not be
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able to reap the claimed benefits of globalisation or international economic
integration." In his investigation of the intra-country integration of China,
Jiawen Yang (2002:49) states that although China has a vast collection of
small and medium sized firms, it has:
"Very few large conglomerates, whose businesses can span all over China and/or have
established significant presence in overseas markets. Those many thriving small and medium
sized firms have limited access to markets beyond their respective starting localities. "
This lack of nationally recognisable, cross-provincial conglomerates is
another telltale indicator of the economic disintegration of the Chinese
market. The reality of the matter is that, as Bruce Gilley (2001: 16-19) and
Alwyn Young (2000: 1091-1135) narrate "there is every indication that the
economy of China, while opening up internationally, has become fragmented
internally." China's inter-provincial rivalry is such that "the domestic
economy has become more and more fragmented, riddled with local
protectionist measures ranging from crude roadblocks to sophisticated
technical standards," (Gilley,2001: 17).
This is arguably one of the most important risk factors for SAB-Miller's
productivity and profit margins. The inability of the PRC national
government to unify its domestic market undermines SAB-Miller's potential
for free and fair access to the entire Chinese market. With regards to the
fragmentation of the market, SAB-Miller should pay attention to two main
issues. Firstly, because the breweries are all located in the Eastern Seaboard
provinces, its penetration into the Western provinces is undermined by the
fragmentation of the Chinese market and the relative isolation of hinterland
provinces. Therefore the careful monitoring of the evolution of this inter-
provincial rivalry is a key concern to SAB-Miller. Secondly, because of the
unfair market regulations the competitive edge of SAB-Milleris undermined
by a plethora of competitors, who might remain in business solely because of
local protectionism and not because of market logic.
To counter this negative outlook for FDI, the Chinese State Administration of
Taxation (1999: 13) has unequivocally declared that:
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"To ensure fairness in liability, promote competition on an equal footing and gradually grant
national treatment to foreign funded enterprises, taxes on Chinese and foreign-funded
enterprises will be unified, although necessary preferential taxes maintain." [Italics added].
These "necessary preferential taxes" refer squarely to the tax exemptions for
FDI in certain specified areas, where the PRe government wants to boost
economic growth. According to Li Ning (2000:17) income tax, for instance, for
FDI is 15% while that for domestic firms is 33%." The reasons for this
preferential treatment are clearly visible in the speech by former Premier of
the state council Zhu Rongji (1999:19):
((We should take full advantage of China's social and political stability and sound
macroeconomic conditions to try to absorb as much FDI as possible, particularly investment
from famous transnational corporations and improve the way foreign funds are used. "
Despite the accession to the WTO,and the explicit rule of free competition on
equal footing, it remains unlikely that the PRe government will abolish the
preferential tax treatment for FDI, especially as FDI is earmarked as the
main vehicle for economic growth and for the absorption of retrenched
workers. 80 for the short-term future at least, FDI will retain its privileged
status in the PRe.
4.3. ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION
Since December 2002 the PRe has become a participant in the WTO,
whereby it is obliged to conform to certain international standards and
procedures with regard to trade issues. Despite the amount of obligations
that the eep government has taken on, it can also use its new position as a
means to establish itself as an economic powerhouse on the international
scene. Yet opinions are divided as to whether or not the PRe will be able to
conform to the many WTO rules and regulations, which the government
accepted by signing the accession treaty, (Yang, 2000; Gilley, 2001; Biers,
2001). This sceptical attitude is the result of the massive restructuring task
that eep government has to implement concurrently with the
implementation of these new rules and regulations. As long as the necessary
success in this drastic reformation of the economy is still underway, the
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experts remain sceptical with regards to the PRC's ability to implement WTO
standards and regulations.
4.3.1. Acceptable Non-Compliance
Qingjiang Kong (2001:1184) states that any member state of the WTO is
faced with two critical aspects that accession forces upon signatory
members. The first is the internal implementation and enforcement of the
details of the accession agreement. Secondly, the member state has to show
tolerance towards relinquishing some economic sovereignty by allowing
external overseeing of its domestic affairs by the relevant WTO organs, in
cases of disputes. In such a dispute between member states, for instance in
terms of non-compliance, the "refusal of a WTO member, involved in a
dispute dealt with by a WTO panel to take recommended compliance
measures, would lead to unilateral retaliation," (Kong, 2001: 1185). Despite
the CCP's good intentions by signing the agreement, the question still
remains: can the PRC comply, apply and enforce all of the WTOregulations?
Surely no one doubts that the PRC is evidently liberalising its economy and
that it is specifically aiming to affect its market reforms, in line with WTO
principles. Yet surely it is unrealistic to demand immediate and full
compliance from the PRC. It is already very encouraging that the PRC is
showing increased commitment to and compliance with international
treaties and protocols. As such, the PRC should not be judged upon too
harshly without extending to them a delay-period of approximately 5 years.
Yet some important lacunae still exist in the PRC's socio-economic structure
that might complicate the enforcement of the WTOagreements. China has a
poor track record in terms of legal independence or even established rule of
law. Actually, as Kong (2001: 1189) states "it is the rule through law rather
than the rule of law," that exists in the PRC at present. Secondly, increased
social pressures could lead to a diminishing adherence to the WTO's
principles and these social pressures might intensify the belligerence of the
population. This could lead to a dangerous situation if the intensity of the
social discontent forces the CCP to renege some or all of its duties and
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obligations towards the WTO. Though unlikely, this scenario if it does
happen, could be at the expense of imploding the entire economy. Lastly,
and most importantly, the "non-institutional central-local relationship,"
(Kong, 2001: 1192) still blocks a countrywide implementation of international
law and regulations. The reasons and origins of this are mentioned and
outlined above. Again, SAB-Miller is well advised to monitor the
developments of this 'center vs periphery' power struggle, as it may well be
the most critical socio-political risk factor.
According to Kong (2001:12066) the PRC government needs to strengthen
four main aspects in order to secure compliance. First, they need to amend
or repeal inconsistent domestic laws, which conflict with WTO standards.
Secondly, it needs to create a framework through which international law
and practice can be incorporated into the Chinese legal system. Thirdly, it
needs to press for uniform administration of the standards and agreements.
Lastly, it needs to create "an independent, fair and effective administrative
legal system and a judicial review system," through which a market economy
can flourish and the rule of law can be implemented.
4.3.2. Strengthening Democratic Participation
What most analysts agree upon, however, is that in the short-term the
impact of the WTOaccession will raise the stakes for the CCP government in
two ways. First, it is critical that it continues its socio-economic
restructuring process, and sees it through. Secondly, it needs to increase the
level of democratic participation for the newly emerging socio-economic
interest groups of society to a workable minimum. According to Wang (2003:
42) the only way the CCP government can alleviate the stresses and strains
of the accession is by consolidating the process of "democratic state building,
namely to strengthen essential state governing capacities while
institutionalising inclusive participation and public contestation." As
mentioned above, these newly emerging socio-economic elites are gaining a
foothold in CCP agenda setting, yet this process is still obscure and without
real accountability or public scrutiny.
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One of the most important stumbling blocs in extending public contestation
and inclusive participation is caused by the nature of the Chinese
constitution as it is "similar to other socialist constitutions, in that it gives
the CCP a monopoly of political power and it rejects the notions of division in
checks and balances of power," (Yang, 2000:438). With such a constitution,
basically a manifesto for unfettered CCP government, democratic
participation is an alien concept to the Chinese state. As such, genuine
democratic participation is very much dependent on the pragmatic goodwill
of CCP officials and limited provincially based township and village elections.
Despite the relative stalemate ill the democratisation process, an
intrinsically related, yet far more critical process needs to be monitored more
attentively. Xiaokai Yang (2000:473) calls this process the "Dual Track
Approach," of the CCP government. Simply put, the CCP has, ever since its
reforms began, always applied two different sets of economic principles for
domestic players and for foreign enterprises, to the detriment of local firms.
Similarly, it has applied a different course of socio-economic development in
the Eastern Seaboard provinces vis ct vis the underdeveloped landlocked
Western provinces. The result is now that there is a distributive impasse,
obstructing the fair extension of the gains of economic prosperity evenly
across the entire nation. As Yang (2000:473) predicts "the dual track
approach may exacerbate the inefficient inequality of income distribution,
further institutionalise state opportunism and corruption, lower moral
standards and increase social tensions."
The critical factor here is whether the CCP government will use the
momentum of WTOaccession to either rectify this dual track approach or if
it will entrench it even further. Ideally, WTO accession should "stimulate
demand from Chinese citizens for constitutional rules that relate to
economic and judicial game rules." (Yang, 2000:441). If this opportunity is
not grasped either by the Chinese citizenry or by the CCP itself, the
prediction that state opportunism (i.e. the process whereby the rule maker,
the rule enforcer and the rule arbitrator are the very same state apparatus)
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will further entrench its detrimental hold on the economy, might very well
sour the overall restructuring process.
It is clear that in the short-term there will be very clear economic winners
and losers, after the WTOaccession, a process that actually already started
in 1993, after the second phase of Deng Xiao Ping's reformation. In his
evaluation of the implications of the WTO accession, Shaoguang Wang
(2000) argues that these distributive conflicts might hamper economic
development. As Wang (2000:376) clearly states:
"When the state lacks the capacity to manage conflicts and social tensions run deep, it would
be hard for the state to coordinate social interests on stabilisation and growth-promoting
policies, not to mention enlisting the support of most social groups in making short-run
sacrifices, at times of exogenous shocks and macro-economic crises. JJ
It is clear that the governance deficit of the CCP will be exacerbated, but
what is less clear is whether this deficit will lead to any significant change in
the PRC's economic policies. One of the biggest indicators of this lagging
governance deficit is found in the lack of tax compliance by the citizenry and
the inefficient fiscal system. In a system where tax collection is incomplete at
best, and in a system where the taxpayer has no meaningful voice in the
allocation and expenditure of the taxes, the taxpayer feels little incentive to
pay his dues. As such, the governance deficit is most critically felt in
government's revenue budget. As Wang (2000:378) clearly states distributive
conflicts are easier to remedy in a system where tax collection is connected
with increased participation. "Only when the government possesses such a
strong extractive capacity can it play the distributive role," which is unlikely
to occur unless the taxpayer is given an "institutionalised voice" in the
budget allocation.
The question of winners and losers in the post-WTO PRC is largely focussed
on the fate of farmers and retrenched urban workers. With the influx of
agricultural produce from outside, the Chinese farmer will be hardest hit,
especially since he already occupies one of the most disadvantaged positions
in Chinese society. It is a tentative estimate that between 13 to 15 million
farmers will be unemployed between 2000 and 2010 (Wang, 2000:397). The
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49
result will be an influx into the modernised urban Eastern provinces. The
urban workers of those provinces are already suffering themselves under the
restructuring processes. Wang (2000:398) estimates that number of
unemployed urban workers to be around 25 to 30 million. Add the major
influx of rural unemployed to the growing number of retrenched urban
workers, and the employment situation in China is looking quite bleak. As
such, the prediction that the PRC needs to maintain a minimum growth rate
of 7%-9% per annum is of crucial importance.
Yet some authors (Wang, 2000; Biers 2001) claim that the PRC will not be
able to achieve that rate, and even if they were to, they still would be unable
to stem the negative trend of retrenchments. This assertion is highly
disputed by others (Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2001; Fewsmith, 2001 and
Rongji, 2003). The critical factor separating the positive scenario from the
negative scenario outlook is the ability of domestic investments and FDI to
create employment opportunities; their ability to absorb retrenched workers
and, thus, stimulate the overall growth of the economy. An additional tool
employed by the CCP government is the utilisation of limited but highly
effective labour unions to operate, assist and retrain retrenched workers and
give them some voice in the restructuring process.
The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)is specifically charged
with these tasks. It remains fair to say that ACFTU does not have the
pervasive presence that their name implies. In order to attract foreign and
domestic investors, some provincial governments have limited or blocked the
operations of trade unions. Secondly, it is no surprise or secret that the PRC
is a highly attractive FDI market precisely because it is able to provide a
cheap and abundant labour force, without too much institutional hassles
and restraints.
Yet any FDI that does not employ some level of unionisation is posing a risk
to itself. This is a fair warning for SAB-Miller, as its labour practices might
mitigate or exacerbate such sector-specific risks. As Leong Liew (2001:55)
claims, through setting minimum labour standards, labour productivity may
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rise instead of merely just increase the costs to the company as "working
conditions, according to efficiency-wageeconomic models' arguments, have a
direct bearing on labour productivity." Also, let us not forget that with the
rise in importance of labour and human rights abuses to the general public,
no multinational can afford to exploit abusively and get away unscathed. As
Liew (2001:59) concludes, multinationals have much to gain in having a
reasonable labour union. The situation of SAB-Millerin this respect is very
similar to what the CCP government faces on the national level. Since the
social costs of retrenchments and downsizing are to be borne by the
workforce, established collective bargaining between labour and state is
critical, as labour depends on the state for social benefits and health
securities, in the same proportion as the state needs the support,
acquiescence and cooperation of the labour unions for the continuation of
the restructuring process.
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v. SECTOR-SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS
5.1. SAB-MILLER'S ACHIEVEMENTS
The focus of this section is to describe the risk management policies
available to SAB-Miller,wishing to elaborate on their existing investments in
the beer and lager industry of the PRC. The company, South African
Breweries-Miller Limited (SAB-Miller), has already acquired control of
numerous breweries in China since it entered the PRC in 1994. These
acquisitions bring SAB-Miller's production capacity up to nearly 27 million
hectolitres per annum in China (O'Hagan, 1998: 1), more than it produces in
its home country of South Africa. In terms of its international statistics,
(Klein, 2003:12), SAB-Milleris the second largest brewer in the world, active
in over 122 breweries across 40 countries and employing approximately
45.000 employees. At a turnover of $1.9 billion and with earnings of over
$581m in the year 2003 (until March) alone, SAB-Miller is quite clearly a
major player in the global beer industry. In its annual global production,
SAB-Millerhad a volume of 115.8million hectolitres of lager. As shown in its
recent mergers and acquisitions of international breweries, specifically in the
PRC, SAB-Milleris eager to augment their massive production levels and as
such achieve even higher turnovers.
By doing this, SAB-Miller has proven to be one of the few successful
companies to have invested in the PRC. Considering the track record of most
MNC's investing in China, this is a formidable feat. According to Roy
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Bagattini, managing director of SAB-Miller's China operation, their success
lays in the fact that SAB-Miller:
«Has tailored both its product and operations to its location. We usually buy a local brewery,
rather than building our own, and then upgrade it under local management to produce local
beers for specific second-tier markets, rather than competing on the high end. "(Kurlantzick,
2002:1).
Evidence of this tactic is to be found in their recent acquisition, to the value
of 29.6% of the Chinese brewer Harbin, the oldest brand in China, for $87
million in cash (Klein, 2003: 12). Through its joint venture-ship partner
China Resources Breweries, SAB-Millerhas taken a claim in 30 breweries in
over 9 provinces. Yet not only SAB-Miller has been busy snatching up
existing breweries. In terms of its Chinese competitors, it should be noted
that the Beijing based Yanjing Brewery, China's second largest brewer, has
taken control of rival Huiqian Brewery Group, in the industry's first takeover
involving two publicly traded Chinese companies, (Business Report, 2003).
This indicates a rising maturation of the beer industry in the PRC.
The Yanjing Brewery claims it wants to become one of the world's 10 largest
breweries by 2005. This information is relevant to the SAB-Miller group in
two ways. First, it is a sign of the vitality and profitability of the Chinese
market. Secondly, direct competition of a Chinese brewer could make a
much larger impact on the sales and earnings of SAB-Miller, than for
instance another foreign brewer. In a developing country with a daunting
restructuring agenda, foreign firms might become the target of consumer
boycotts in a possible wave of nationalism and xenophobia. As such, SAB-
Miller should do well to analyse the mood swings of the consumers, as well
as maintain an acceptable socio-economic profile and exhibit corporate
responsibility, especially since its industry is one that creates socially
disruptive behavioural patterns, through alcoholism and the related
disintegration of societal structures.
An important micro-risk factor for SAB-Miller's investments is the existence
of an inefficient distribution system in the PRC. At present, this distribution
system is a hybrid mixture of "old state-planned networks coexisting with
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market-oriented forces," (Zhang, 2001:1247). The mam Issue here is that
because this chain of distribution is still very inefficient and unregulated, it
undermines the price-competitiveness of SAB-Miller's product to the
consumer. As Zhang (2001:1250) states "foreign exporters meet a regulatory
barrier, which obliges them to transact with a Chinese middleman and
entitles the latter to mark-up the price when reselling it downstream to the
end-user." This inefficient canalisation and intermediation process, however,
is an established practice, but one with a negative impact for foreign
investors. Clearly, SAB-Millerhas a dilemma as to which middleman to use
and to what extent this choice will affect SAB-Miller'sprice competitiveness.
Luckily, WTOstandards block the continuation of this practice. Through the
WTOagreement, the PRC needs to amend this inefficient practice and grant
national treatment to foreign producers and allow them direct access to end-
users, without local middlemen, thereby cutting the regulatory barriers and
hence increase the competitiveness of the product. As such, SAB-Miller is
strongly advised to monitor developments in this area, and if need be, lobby
for compliance either to the PRC government or through the WTO dispute
mechanisms. This example clearly demonstrates the need for continual
monitoring of the situation. Since SAB-Miller is already inside the PRC
market, it needs less a risk analysis report of the PRC, as it needs a risk
management report, enabling them to deal effectively and timely with
unforeseen occurrences. Since the major risks to SAB-Miller are largely
limited to the ones outlined above, SAB-Millercan decisively formulate long-
to medium-term risk forecasts and also implement the correct risk
management strategies. With this in mind, the next section will investigate
the necessity of risk management policies and show how they can be
implemented and evaluated.
5.2. Risk Management Policies
In the above-cited statement by its managing director Roy Bagattini, it is
evident that SAB-Millerhas done more than just 'tailor its operations to its
location'. What this statement reveals is that SAB-Miller has done a
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thorough risk analysis and that it has in place a comprehensive risk
management and risk mitigation strategy. As Brink (2002:27) states "the aim
of a political risk management technique is to reduce a firm's exposure and
vulnerability to political risk without having to drastically change the firm's
strategy." As a MNC, SAB-Milleris operating in an environment unlike that
of its South African home nation. Operating in a different culture under a
different legal system with different values and customs clearly complicates
the management of the company. Besides the complexity of day-to-day
activities, the MNCis caught between the complexities of the host country
socio-economic dynamics, intrastate dynamics, environmental dynamics and
all the possible permutations of the previously mentioned. Devising a risk
management policy is, therefore, not such a straightforward issue.
The ripple effects of these ever-changing circumstances affect the
functioning and efficiency of the company continuously. So it is quite
understandable that every company needs to have a risk management policy
in place, as well as have various contingency plans and thorough risk
insurance. One such investment insurance agency is the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)"a World Bank initiative, designed to
promote and protect direct investment projects in developing countries,"
(Brink, 2002:22). Basically, it gives investors insurance against political
risks, such as against host government actions, expropriation, restrictions
on currency transfers, etc. MIGA can provide long-term insurance for
companies and also serves as a "forum for the discussion of investment
policies and problems and contributes in a variety of ways to the reduction
of barriers to international direct investment and improved investment
climates," (Brink, 2002:23). Clearly, it is in SAB-Miller's interest to acquire
such insurance and to adhere to the advice of such a forum. Foresight and
insider knowledge are paramount in mitigating the possibilities of risks
occurring and affecting the company.
However, when the company investigates micro- and macro-risks, it should
not be blinded by the impression that risks solely originate from outside the
company. As Brink (2002) rightly indicates, companies can often become
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risks to themselves, in their bid to approach host governments for the
development of certain privileged relationships". In China specifically, this is
a sound yet sly tactic, as it can backfire with catastrophic consequences. For
instance, in case the incumbent provincial government gets expelled,
relieved of office or subverted, those with close relationships might become a
source of embarrassment to the new leadership. Worse still, the company
itself might become an agent of political instability and ultimately a risk to
its own investments. SAB-Miller should therefore be cautious in its
necessary relationships with Chinese government officials. This caution does
not imply that a regime change is imminent in the PRC, in the short- to
medium-term. What it means more specifically is that with any provincial
leadership being appointed by Beijing, close ties between business and
government might become a source of embarrassment, in case of a sudden
and unexpected leadership change. This is not an uncommon feature for a
political system, where governmental appointments are made outside official
electoral proceedings, and solely by the deliberation of the CCP caucus in
Beijing.
Obviously, the relationship between government and company is never one
of equal footing. Companies are involved with socio-political factors in as far
as they pertain to the company's potential losses or gains. Governments, by
function of their office, need to keep abreast of the socio-economic and
political needs of their constituent population, even in an autocratic state as
is China. These two fundamentally conflicting motivations can sour
relationships between host government and foreign investor quite quickly.
Therefore, any company should always attempt to moderate their desire for
privileged access and influence, so as to make "provision for the right to
influence macroeconomic and social policy makers, though, as the privileged
party, not secretly but openly and in concert with labour and consumer
groups," (Brink, 2002:25). Only in such a way can SAB-Milleracquire a say
in the policy formulation process, concurrent with keeping a (relatively)
neutral image, a necessary stance for the mitigation of any risks, which may
originate from the company's business policies.
8 For a critical and detailed account on how to deal with Chinese business partners and government officials,
reading Wang, Zhang and Goodfellow's 1998. Business Culture in China, is a must.
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Despite their conflicting motivations, governments and MNC's need one
another. SAB-Miller must appreciate the role played by the Chinese
government in establishing the rules of free market competition, in providing
a climate conducive to the exploitation of competitive advantage, in the
transference of knowledge and in the area of human development, not to
mention in maintaining the basic infrastructural necessities, such as roads,
ports, customs, etc. As Brink (2002:7) unequivocally states "to the MNC, the
host government can represent the key to the local market or access to
resources, that provide new opportunities for profit, growth, and the
improvement of its competitive position." As such, an optimal relationship
between SAB-Miller and the provincial or national government is a
prerequisite for successful business and an integral part of a coherent risk
management policy.
5.3. Risk Management Techniques
Companies, however, need to establish a risk analysis and risk management
plan prior to investing in a country. After this critical initial step, there are
two standard techniques of managing, reducing, avoiding or minimising the
impact of political or economic risk factors. First, one has the 'integrating
technique' that aims to integrate the MNC into the host society, by
appointing local managers, by adopting local custom-specific practices, so as
to give the MNC less the appearance of a 'foreign' company. Brink (2002:6)
identifies therefore "polycentrism," as a key concept in this technique.
Instead of ethnocentrically directing the company according to home nation
rules, customs and values, the MNC aims to adapt and fit into the host
society by pulling in local knowledge and know-how. SAB-Miller has
achieved laudable progress with this technique in the PRC and it is therefore
advised to continue with this successful technique.
However, such an approach leaves an MNCopen to host nation interference,
a lack of global focus and it can undermine the formulation of a global
strategy necessary for an MNCin order to reach uniform global standards in
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its services and products. It is with this downside in mind, that SAB-Miller
must always have a 'protective technique'. This technique is described by
Brink (2002:11) as:
"To discourage host government interference, or in the event of interference, minimise the
firm's potential losses. Protective techniques generally provide for the non-integration of the
foreign operations into the host country environment. "
This 'protective technique' deals predominantly with production issues,
managerial styles, financial considerations, research and development (R&D)
and marketing policies, which the MNCaims to keep to itself so as to fashion
them according to its specific global outlook. Getting too caught up in the
'integrating techniques' could make the MNC loose focus of the bigger
picture, as well as blind it to a changing global frame of opportunities. As
such, a correct and healthy balance between these two techniques is a must
for SAB-Miller.
SAB-Miller has a track record in China that proves just how successfully it
has balanced these two techniques. Through one of its latest acquisitions,
SAB-Millerhas invested in a joint venture with the Chinese CRE Beverage
Limited in the Northeast Jilin Province, acquiring 49% of their shares. It has
done similar joint ventures with three other Chinese breweries in Shenyang,
Shenzhen and Dalian. These are clear examples of how to integrate a South
African company with Chinese partners, and thus far, it has proven to be a
huge success for all parties. However, taking up joint venture-ships does not
make SAB-Millera full-blown integrationist. Understandably, SAB-Millerhas
withheld the rights to and patents of its products and its manufacturing
technologies from its Chinese business partners. It is in balancing the
inherent risks of cooperation and in achieving a decent consensus between
the South African and the Chinese partners that the middle way is found.
The abundant evidence of SAB-Miller'ssuccess should go to prove that SAB-
Miller is clearly successful in the PRC, because it is correctly combining both
techniques. SAB-Miller should elaborate on these successes and maintain
their investment strategies that integrate both these techniques.
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So, in a short summary, one can identify five steps that need to be taken in
order to assess the potential risks and the consequent managerial
responses. According to Brink (2002:26) the first step is identifying the
relevant stakeholders: home-and host governments, trade unions, civil
society, suppliers, etc. The combined knowledge and expertise of all these
groups can give an accurate picture of the "do's and do not's" of foreign
investing and these groups will most certainly highlight some potential
pitfalls for the company. Secondly, after the initial intelligence gathering has
finished, the MNC can analyse the extent of its obligations and
responsibilities towards these stakeholders and it can start to identify
market opportunities, as well as abandon or modify less profitable
investments.
As a third step, a MNC'smust continue the process of data gathering, so as
to make "provision for the constant monitoring and analysis of a host
country's policy environment, specifically with regards to the impact its
policies might have on a specific industry's and host country's overall
investment climate," (Brink, 2002:27). At numerous occasions the socio-
political and economic developments specifically relevant to SAB-Miller's
investments have been highlighted. These areas of concern need to be
monitored over time and they require continuous and ongoing assessment so
as to enable SAB-Millerthe time to respond to any potential problems before
these can crystallise into full-blown risks, whether of macro- or micro-level
importance.
Fourthly, a MNCmust always be on the lookout for unforeseen challenges
and risks. Vigilance is a necessary attitude and it cannot be substituted for
anything else. As a last step, MNC's must make a conscious decision to
respect and balance both home- and host government customs and values.
Corporate responsibility is increasingly gaining momentum and scrutiny in
the global arena. A MNC aiming to become a global player cannot simply
exploit and pollute some regions irresponsibly without being held
accountable or somewhat responsible. It needs to make sure that the
company itself does not become a source of instability to its own
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investments. We have already touched upon the various ways in which SAB-
Miller might become a risk to itself. So, clearly, it is advised to closely
scrutinise its own practices so as to minimise the possibilities of company-
based risk factors.
It is in balancing these five steps that SAB-Miller can attempt to calculate
and evaluate eventual socio-political risks. As Brink (2002:25) concisely
states:
"Political risk management entails the constant updating of these plans in an attempt to adapt
the organisation to internal and external socio-political and socio-economic changes, and in
doing so, favour flexible over rigid planning, assuming that MNC's have the resources
(financial and human) to plan and act flexibly. JJ
Political risk analysis is more of an art than a SCIence.MNC's, therefore,
have to become adept at sensing the covert and overt risks and opportunities
inherent in foreign investment. Only by understanding their roles in the host
society and by doing a thorough job of assessing and investigating the socio-
economic climate can risks be calculated and effectivelymanaged.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This report has attempted to demonstrate that the investment climate of the
PRC is a relatively stable and highly profitable one. In terms of the
investments made by SAB-Miller it has already achieved remarkable
successes. Its future plans of expanding investments should be hinged on
and assessed by the evolution of the PRC's restructuring process. Monitoring
the critical macro-level socio-economic and political developments should
indicate the health of the PRC's investment climate. At present, that climate
is stable and with the effects of the WTO accession filtering through, the
Chinese economy should be strengthened considerably in the medium-to
long-term. Yet, there can be no substitute for eternal vigilance with regards
to the impact of the restructuring process on the PRC's economy.
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The main points of caution on a macro-economic level are based on the
rural/urban prosperity and unemployment problem. The development in
this area is critical for the assessment of the level of societal (dis)content and
also for the level of acquiescence by the population with the ongoing
restructuring process. Secondly, a macro-level factor of concern is the
structural underdevelopment, as it is manifested by an inefficient fiscal
structure. The fragmentation of the fiscal, the political and the market
structures is the direct cause of this underdevelopment, and as such the
ongoing 'tug of war' between the provinces and the centre will be paramount
in the resolution of this grave concern.
Thirdly, the success rate of SOE's reform will be a critical example of the
health of the Chinese economy and a good barometer of how committed the
PRC is to the implementation of the WTOframework. Intrinsically linked to
this is the restructuring process of the financial sector. This process will be
highly relevant to the survival of the Chinese economy as a whole and it
depends mainly on sustaining trust in its banking sector. With many
outstanding NPL's to numerous defunct SOE's, the banking sector in the
PRC is in dire need of reform. Quite clearly, the importance of this reform
cannot be understated, as it is the linchpin of a healthy and correctly
functioning economy. As a last macro-economic risk factor, any astute
investor should closely monitor the level of success of the government in the
provision of social safety nets. The provision of these safety nets is a
necessary development in order to cope with societal discontent, resulting
from the massive restructuring process. The critical factor here is the
intensity of the commitment of the ruling party to create these nets and to
allocate sufficient funds from their budgets to counter the inevitable
pauperisation that retrenchments will force upon millions of farmers and
urban factory workers. Clearly, urbanisation, housing, crime and health
concerns are all logical extensions of the provision of social safety nets, or
the lack thereof. Although, there are all clearly macro-level risks, they
pertain to any investor in any PRC sector.
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Sector-specifically, SAB-Miller should monitor the wornsome market
fragmentation in the PRC, which clearly augments the risks of the made
investments by lowering the profitability of the acquired breweries. With the
market heavily fragmented, SAB-Miller loses its possible outreach to all of
the Chinese consumer groups across the PRC. Even if they do manage to
transport their products to the most remote corners of China, the existing
trade barriers and high tariffs might undermine any price competitiveness
that may flow from the logic of vertical and horizontal FDI in the PRC.
Clearly, this is one of the most important risks to SAB-Miller.
Secondly, the continued existence of the 'Dual Track Economy' of the PRC
might exacerbate the tensions of the uneven playing field, as it exists for
both domestic and foreign enterprises. Since, FDI is given preferential
treatment, a definite bonus for SAB-Miller, some domestic breweries will
inevitably use their provincial contacts to resist fair competition with SAB-
Miller. This implies the possibility that provincial breweries will use their
privileged contacts with the provincial governments to lobby for higher tariffs
and/or unfair trade practices against SAB-Miller, which will be at the
detriment of SAB-Miller'sproduct competitiveness.
This raises the last important micro-level risk, namely the use (or not) of
local distribution systems and Chinese middlemen at the expense of price
competitiveness. In this instance, as with the above-mentioned unfair-trade
practices, SAB-Miller has the option of bringing their complaints before the
WTOor before a Chinese Court of Law. Though that is completely within the
boundaries of the law, such drastic actions might make SAB-Miller highly
unpopular in a fairly nationalistic China. As such, SAB-Miller might be
posing the biggest risk to itself, by its very own actions. Clearly, this is a very
sensitive issue to SAB-Miller and as such it needs to proceed cautiously in
the initial stages. SAB-Milleris well advised to consider, in the eventuality of
such unfair trade discrimination, to allow the PRC a grace period of
approximately 5 years. Keeping the enormous restructuring task of the CCP
government in mind, such a period of grace should be in proportion to the
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enormous profit-potential SAB-Miller stands to grun from the Chinese
market. After that period, the PRC should have internalised the WTO
agreements much more profoundly, so that any legal arbitration of trade
disputes can take its course, without the possibility of a dramatic backlash.
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